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Differentially private Nash equilibrium seeking for networked
aggregative games
Maojiao Ye, Guoqiang Hu, Lihua Xie and Shengyuan Xu
Abstract—This paper considers the privacy-preserving Nash
equilibrium seeking strategy design for a class of networked
aggregative games, in which the players’ objective functions
are considered to be sensitive information to be protected.
In particular, we consider that the networked game is free
of central node and the aggregate information is not directly
available to the players. As there is no central authority to
provide the aggregate information required by each player to
update their actions, a dynamic average consensus protocol
is employed to estimate it. To protect the players’ privacy,
we perturb the transmitted information among the players by
independent random noises drawn from Laplace distributions.
By synthesizing the perturbed average consensus protocol
with a gradient algorithm, distributed privacy-preserving Nash
equilibrium seeking strategies are established for the aggrega-
tive games under both fixed and time-varying communication
topologies. With explicit quantifications of the mean square
errors, the convergence results of the proposed methods are
presented. Moreover, it is analytically proven that the proposed
algorithm is ǫ-differentially private, where ǫ depends on the
stepsize of the gradient algorithm and the scaling parameter
of the random variables. The presented results indicate that
there is a tradeoff between the convergence accuracy and the
privacy level. Lastly, a numerical example is provided for the
verification of the proposed methods.
Index Terms—Nash equilibrium seeking; privacy protection;
differential privacy; random variable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy has become a critical concern for many practical
systems that involve sensitive data transmission and collec-
tion. Wireless sensor networks [1], smart grids [2], social
networks [3], just to name a few, are typical examples that
are in urgent need of privacy protection techniques. Inspired
by the fact that privacy preservation is pivotal in information-
sensitive systems, privacy protection methods have gained
increasing attention in recent years. For instance, in the field
of database and data mining, cryptographic secure multi-
party computation methods, random perturbation techniques
and l-diversity, k-anonymity based algorithms were adopted
for information sharing systems, data collection systems
and data publishing systems, respectively [1]. Homomorphic
encryption was adapted for privacy protection in smart
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grids in [2]. Randomization, k-anonymity and generalization-
based approaches can be utilized for privacy protection in
social networks [3]. Motivated by the importance of privacy
protection, this paper aims to achieve the distributed Nash
equilibrium seeking for networked aggregative games with
privacy guarantees.
In many practical situations, the utilities associated with
the interacting decision-makers rely both on the decision-
maker’s own action and an aggregate of all the decision-
makers’ actions. For example, in the energy consumption
model described in [8], the utilities of the electricity users
are determined by the user’s own energy consumption as
well as the total energy consumption in the electricity
market. Cournot price/quantity competitions among multiple
oligopolistic firms fall into similar scenario [4]. In factory
production, the utility of each manufactory relies on the
averaged output of all the engaged manufactories and the
manufactory’s own production [5]. In addition, public good
provision models and many other examples are also of
aggregative nature, i.e., the interacting participants affect
each other through a specific aggregate of their actions rather
than in an arbitrary fashion [6]. Aggregative games serve as
powerful game theoretic models to accommodate these com-
petitive circumstances with aggregative interactions among
multiple decision-makers. Motivated by the wide applications
of aggregative games in distributed systems, Nash equi-
librium seeking for aggregative games on communication
graphs is attracting increasing attention in recent years [7]-
[11].
A discrete-time method was proposed in [7] for networked
aggregative games and a continuous-time counterpart was
provided in [8] considering their applications for demand
response in smart grids. A gossip-based algorithm was
proposed to achieve distributed Nash equilibrium seeking in
an asynchronous fashion in [9]. Coupled constraints were
further addressed in [10]. The authors in [11] considered
quadratic quasi-aggregative games, in which the players’
objective functions depend on the players’ actions and an
aggregate of its neighbors’ actions. From the perspective
of privacy issues, the works in [12][13] shed some light
on the privacy protection for aggregative games. However,
in the mechanisms of the game, there is a mediator/weak
mediator, that can receive information from the players and
give suggested actions for the players, to induce the players’
behaviours. Hence, the methods in [12][13] are not dis-
tributed. To achieve distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for
networked games, the players usually need to broadcast their
local information to their neighbors via local communication
networks. The information dissemination among the players
may raise privacy concern for the players. Nevertheless, to
the best of the authors’ knowledge, privacy issues have
rarely been explored for distributed Nash equilibrium
seeking schemes though it is a problem of significant
interest. Motivated by the above observation, this paper
considers privacy-preserving distributed Nash equilibrium
seeking for networked aggregative games by utilizing the
notion of differential privacy [21].
Differential privacy has been widely adopted to describe
the privacy level in many situations that include sensitive
information. For example, the differential privacy of the
agents engaged in distributed optimization problems was
established in [14]-[17]. In [14], random noises were utilized
for the protection of the agents’ objective functions. Based
on the notion of differential privacy, the tradeoff between the
convergence accuracy and the privacy level was analyzed.
In [15], the constraints of the optimization problem were
considered to be the private information to be protected.
Based on the stochastic gradient method, a private optimiza-
tion algorithm was developed by introducing additive noises.
Instead of probing the transmitted messages, the authors
in [16] proposed a functional perturbation algorithm which
ensures that the inaccuracy of the optimization algorithm is
only resulted from the introduced noises. In [17], both the
agents’ states and moving directions were masked by random
noises to achieve the privacy protection of the agents’ local
objective functions. Differentially private average consensus
protocols have also been widely studied (see e.g., [18]-[20],
to mention just a few). For instance, the agents’ initial states
were considered to be private information to be protected in
the average consensus problems in [18], where the authors
developed an asymptotically convergent algorithm to achieve
privacy protection. Both a non-exact convergent algorithm
and an almost surely convergent algorithm were established
to achieve differentially private average consensus in [19].
Moreover, differential privacy has been extensively investi-
gated in the area of database and data mining. Interested
readers are referred to [21] for a survey on differential
privacy.
To shed some light on privacy-protected Nash equilibrium
seeking for aggregative games under distributed communi-
cation networks, this paper proposes a distributed algorithm
by perturbing the transmitted information among the players
using random variables. Moreover, motivated by the obser-
vation that differential privacy is robust against the auxiliary
information exposed to the adversary, we adopt it to describe
the players’ privacy level in this paper. In brief, the main
contributions of the paper are summarized as follows.
1) This paper considers privacy-preserving distributed
Nash equilibrium seeking for networked aggregative
games. To achieve the goal, we employ a dynamic
average consensus protocol for the distributed estima-
tion of the players’ aggregate actions. To protect the
players’ privacy, the information transmitted among
the players in the consensus part is perturbed by
independent random noises drawn from Laplace distri-
butions. By utilizing the perturbed consensus protocol
and a gradient method with a decaying stepsize, dis-
tributed privacy-preserving Nash equilibrium strategies
are established for games under fixed and time-varying
communication graphs, respectively.
2) The convergence result and the privacy level of the pro-
posed methods are analytically investigated. In particu-
lar, the mean square error bound and privacy parameter
are explicitly quantified. The presented results illustrate
that the privacy level depends on the selection of the
initial stepsize, the decaying rate of the stepsize as
well as the scaling parameter of the random variables.
Moreover, it is shown that there is a tradeoff between
the convergence accuracy and the privacy level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides some preliminaries and formulates the considered
problem. The main results are given in Section III, where the
distributed algorithm is presented with its convergence accu-
racy and privacy level successively investigated. Moreover,
the results under fixed communication topologies are ex-
tended to time-varying communication topologies in Section
IV. In Section V, a numerical example is provided to verify
the effectiveness of the proposed method. Lastly, conclusions
are drawn in Section VI.
Notations: In this paper, we use R and R+ to denote the
set of real numbers and positive real numbers, respectively.
Moreover, Z+ denotes the set of non-negative integers. Let
v be a vector or matrix, then ||v|| denotes the ℓ2-norm of
v. Moreover, ||v||∞ denotes the ℓ∞-norm of v. We say
that a random variable w ∼ Lap(b), where b ∈ R+, if its
probability density function is
L(w, b) = 1
2b
e−
|w|
b .
In addition, E(Φ) is the expectation of Φ. The partial
derivative of fi(x) with respect to xi is denoted as ∇ifi(x),
where x = [x1, x2, · · · , xN ]T . Moreover, 1N denotes an
N -dimensional column vector whose elements are all 1
and the transpose of Ψ, where Ψ is either a matrix or
a vector, is denoted as ΨT . The notation [gi]vec for i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N} denotes a column vector whose ith element
is gi. For a sequence g(k), where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, · · · } and
g(k) is either a vector or a scalar, g(∞) = limk→∞ g(k)
given that limk→∞ g(k) exists. The maximum and mini-
mum eigenvalues of a symmetric matrix P are denoted as
λmax(P ) and λmin(P ), respectively. For a matrix Q, [Q]ij
denotes the entry on the ith row and jth column of Q. In
addition, for li ∈ R, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, the maximum and
minimum values of li are denoted as maxi∈{1,2,··· ,N}{li}
and min{1,2,··· ,N}{li}, respectively.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Preliminaries
In the following, we provide some preliminaries on game
theory and differential privacy.
1) Game Theory: The following game related definitions
are adopted from [8].
Definition 1: (A Normal Form Game) A game in a nor-
mal form is defined as a triple Γ = {V , X, f}, where
V = {1, 2, · · · , N} is the set of players, X = X1 ×
X2 · · · × XN , Xi ⊆ R is the action set of player i and
f = (f1, f2, · · · , fN), where fi is the cost function of player
i.
Definition 2: (Nash Equilibrium) Nash equilibrium is an
action profile on which no player can reduce its cost by
unilaterally changing its own action, i.e., an action profile
x∗ = (x∗i ,x
∗
−i) ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium if for i ∈ V ,
fi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ fi(xi,x∗−i), (1)
for xi ∈ Xi, where x−i =
[x1, x2, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xN ]T .
Definition 3: (Aggregative Game) A game Γ is aggrega-
tive if there exists an aggregative function l(x) : X ∈ R,
which is continuous, additive and separable, such that there
are functions f˜i(xi, l(x)), i ∈ V that satisfy
f˜i(xi, l(x)) = fi(xi,x−i), ∀x ∈ X. (2)
Without loss of generality, we consider that l(x) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi in this paper.
2) Differential privacy: Differential privacy serves as a
mathematical quantification on the level of the engaged
individuals’ privacy guarantee in a statistical database. It
provides a rigorous and formal mathematical formulation on
the privacy of the sensitive data. We refer readers to [21] for
more detailed elaborations on differential privacy and give
the subsequent definitions for clarity of presentation.
Definition 4: (Adjacency) Two function sets F (1) =
{f (1)i }Ni=1, F (2) = {f (2)i }Ni=1 are said to be adjacent if there
exists some i0 ∈ V such that f (1)i = f (2)i , ∀i 6= i0, and
f
(1)
i0
6= f (2)i0 [14][17].
Definition 5: (ǫ-Differential Privacy) Given a positive
constant ǫ, adjacent function sets F (1), F (2) and any ob-
servation O, the algorithm is ǫ-differentially private if
P{F (1)|O} ≤ eǫP{F (2)|O}, (3)
where P{F (j)|O} for j ∈ {1, 2} is the conditional proba-
bility representing the probability of inferring F (j) from the
observation O [14][17].
Remark 1: The above defined ǫ-differential privacy illus-
trates that from the sequences of observations, the adversary
could not distinguish between the two function sets with a
high probability. Hence, it is challenging for the adversary
to identify the players’ sensitive information, which further
indicates that the players are protected from information
leakage. Note that a smaller ǫ indicates a higher level privacy.
B. Problem formulation
Problem 1: Consider an aggregative game in which player
i intends to
minxi fi(xi,x−i) (4)
where
fi(xi,x−i) = f˜i(xi, x¯), (5)
and x¯ = 1
N
∑N
j=1 xj for i ∈ V . Suppose that there is
no central authority to broadcast x¯ and the players can
communicate with each other via a communication graph G,
the objective of this paper is to design a Nash equilibrium
seeking strategy for the aggregative game such that
1) Given any positive constant ǫ, the strategy can be ǫ-
differentially private by tuning the control parameters.
2) The players’ actions can be driven to a neighborhood
of the Nash equilibrium point in the mean square sense,
limk→∞ E(||x(k)−x∗ ||2) ≤ D, where D is a positive
constant that is as small as possible;
Remark 2: Note that the considered aggregative games are
practically inspired by the fact that in many decision-making
processes (e.g., energy consumption control, Cournot quan-
tity competitions, public good provision, factory production,
to mention just a few), the decision-makers affect the others
via their averaged/aggregate behaviors. Moreover, different
from the previous works on distributed Nash equilibrium
seeking for aggregative games [7]-[11], the objective of this
paper includes privacy protection for the players’ cost
functions fi(xi,x−i), i ∈ V .
For notational convenience, let x = [x1, x2, · · · , xN ]T and
with a slight abuse of notation, fi(xi,x−i) and∇ifi(xi,x−i)
might be written as fi(x) and ∇ifi(x), respectively in the
rest of the paper.
The following assumptions (see e.g., [25]) will be utilized
to establish the main results of the paper.
Assumption 1: The players’ objective functions are twice
continuously differentiable functions and∇ifi(x) is globally
Lipschitz for i ∈ V , i.e., there exists a positive constant li
such that
||∇ifi(x)−∇ifi(y)|| ≤ li||x− y||, (6)
for x,y ∈ RN , i ∈ V .
Assumption 2: There exists a positive constant m such
that for x,y ∈ RN ,
(x− y)T (g(x)− g(y)) ≥ m||x− y||2, (7)
where g(x) = [∇1f1(x),∇2f2(x), · · · ,∇NfN (x)]T .
Remark 3: The strong monotonicity condition in Assump-
tion 2 characterizes a global Nash equilibrium, i.e., the Nash
equilibrium is unique under Assumption 2. In addition, by
Assumption 2,
g(x) = 0N , (8)
if and only if x = x∗. Note that it is a widely adopted
assumption in the existing literature and we refer interested
readers to [31] for more insights on the assumption.
Assumption 3: ∇ifi(x) for i ∈ V are uniformly bounded,
i.e., there exists a positive constant C such that for x ∈ RN ,
|∇ifi(x)| ≤ C, ∀i ∈ V .
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING NASH EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING
UNDER FIXED COMMUNICATION GRAPHS
In this section, a privacy-preserving distributed Nash equi-
librium seeking strategy will be proposed for games under
a fixed undirected communication graph G, which is defined
as G = {V , E}. Moreover, V = {1, 2, · · · , N} denotes the
set of vertices and E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges. In this
way, player j can communicate with player i if and only
if (j, i) ∈ E . Associate with G a weight matrix A = [aij ]
whose element on the ith row and jth column is aij . In
this section, we suppose that G and A satisfy the following
assumption:
Assumption 4: The communication graph G is undirected
and connected. Moreover, A satisfies
1) aii > 0, aij > 0 if (j, i) ∈ E and aij = 0 if (j, i) /∈ E .
2) A is doubly stochastic, i.e., A1N = 1N and 1TNA =
1TN .
Let {λi}Ni=1 be the eigenvalues of A and suppose that
λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ,≥ λN . Then, by Assumption 4, λ1 = 1,
λ2 < 1, λN > −1. Moreover, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 1: [32][33] Suppose that Assumption 4 is satis-
fied. Then,
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
(
Ak − 1N1
T
N
N
)∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
(
A− 1N1
T
N
N
)k∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ γk, (9)
where γ is a positive constant such that
ρ
(
A− 1N1
T
N
N
)
≤ γ < 1, (10)
and ρ
(
A− 1N1TN
N
)
is the spectral radius of A− 1N1TN
N
.
A. Method development
As there is no central authority to broadcast x¯ to the
players, we design a strategy by utilizing a synthesis of
consensus protocols and optimization algorithms as in [7]-
[8]. Moreover, to protect the players’ privacy, we utilize
independent random variables to perturb the transmitted
information among the players in the average consensus
protocol. More specifically, each player i, i ∈ V can update
its action according to
xi(k + 1) = xi(k)− αkgi(xi(k), yi(k)), (11)
where k ∈ Z+, αk = cqk, c ∈ R+, q ∈ (0, 1) and
gi(xi, yi) =
(
∂f˜i(xi,x¯)
∂xi
+ ∂f˜i(xi,x¯)
∂x¯
∂x¯
∂xi
)
|x¯=yi . Moreover,
yi(k) is an intermediate variable updated according to
yi(k + 1) =
N∑
j=1
aijpj(k) + xi(k + 1)− xi(k), (12)
in which yi(0) = xi(0), pi(k) = yi(k) + wi(k),
wi(k) ∼ Lap(θk) for i ∈ V are independent random
variables, θk = dq¯
k, d ∈ R+ and q¯ ∈ (q, 1). The steps of
the designed algorithm are described as follows.
Privacy-preserving distributed Nash seeking:
Initialization: Choose xi(0) ∈ R and yi(0) = xi(0).
Iterations:
1. Define pi(k) = yi(k) + wi(k)
2. Update xi(k) according to
xi(k + 1) = xi(k)− αkgi(xi(k), yi(k))
3. Update yi(k) according to
yi(k + 1) =
∑N
j=1 aijpj(k) + xi(k + 1)− xi(k)
end
Let x(k) = [x1(k), x2(k), · · · , xN (k)]T ,y(k) =
[y1(k), y2(k), · · · , yN (k)]T , w(k) =
[w1(k), w2(k), · · · , wN (k)]T and p(k) =
[p1(k), p2(k), · · · , pN (k)]T . Then, the concatenated
vector form of (11)-(12) is
x(k + 1) = x(k)− αk[gi(xi(k), yi(k))]vec
y(k + 1) = Ap(k) + x(k + 1)− x(k). (13)
Remark 4: In this paper, we suppose that there is no
central authority to broadcast x¯(k) to the players. Hence,
player i, i ∈ V would generate a local variable yi(k) to
estimate x¯(k). Moreover, the update of yi(k) in (12) is
motivated by the dynamic average consensus protocol in
[8][23]. However, in the dynamic average consensus protocol
of [8], the players communicate with their neighbors on
their estimates of x¯(k), which may raise privacy concern.
Hence, in (12), we perturb their transmitted information by
utilizing independent random variables. Moreover, different
from the continuous-time scenario proposed in our previous
work in [8], we adopt a decaying stepsize in the presented
algorithm to release the side-effect of the random noises on
the convergence properties to some extent.
Remark 5: In [28], the authors provided necessary and
sufficient conditions for general noise adding mechanisms to
achieve differential privacy. It was shown that the probability
density function of the added noises should have zero mea-
sure for the set of zero-points and the relative probability
density in the considered adjacent sets should be upper
bounded by a positive constant (see the conditions in The-
orem 3.1 of [28] for accurate mathematical descriptions on
the conditions). In addition, Laplace distribution was shown
to satisfy the given conditions. Hence, we follow the existing
works to adopt noises drawn from Laplace distributions with
a decaying parameter to mask the transmitted information.
B. Analysis on the disagreement of estimates
In this section, we provide a bound for the expectation
of the absolute difference between yi(k) and the actual
aggregate action x¯(k). The following lemma is given to
support the quantification of the estimation error.
Lemma 2: Suppose that Assumption 4 is satisfied. Then,
for each nonnegative integer k,
E(|1TNy(k) − 1TNx(k)|) ≤
Nd(1− q¯k)
1− q¯ . (14)
Proof: By (13), we see that
1TNy(k + 1) = 1
T
N(y(k) +w(k)) + 1
T
N(x(k + 1)− x(k)).
(15)
Hence,
1TNy(k + 1)− 1TNx(k + 1)
=1TN (y(k) − x(k)) + 1TNw(k),
(16)
and
|1TNy(k + 1)− 1TNx(k + 1)|
≤|1TN (y(k) − x(k))| + |1TNw(k)|.
(17)
Taking expectations on both sides of (46) gives
E(|1TNy(k + 1)− 1TNx(k + 1)|)
≤E(|1TN (y(k) − x(k))|) + E(|1TNw(k)|)
≤E(|1TN (y(0) − x(0))|) +
k∑
j=0
E(|1TNw(j)|).
(18)
Noticing that y(0) = x(0),
E(|1TNy(k + 1)− 1TNx(k + 1)|)
≤
k∑
j=0
E(|1TNw(j)|) =
Nd(1 − q¯k+1)
1− q¯ ,
(19)
where the last inequality is derived by utilizing E(|wi(j)|) =
dq¯j for i ∈ V .
Remark 6: Actually, by mathematical induction, it can be
obtained that
E(1TNy(k)− 1TNx(k)) = 0, (20)
for all nonnegative integer k. However, due to the effect of
the added noises, we can only conclude that E(|1TNy(k) −
1TNx(k)|) is bounded by Nd(1−q¯
k)
1−q¯ as indicated in Lemma
2. The bias of E(|1TNy(k) − 1TNx(k)|) would result in a
convergence error as indicated in the upcoming theorems.
Based on Lemma 2, the following theorem which estab-
lishes the estimation error bound can be obtained.
Theorem 1: Suppose that Assumptions 3-4 are satisfied.
Then, for each positive integer k,
E(|yi(k)− x¯(k)|)
≤2
√
N(N − 1)C1
N
γk +
2(N − 1)√Ndγ
(γ − q¯)N (γ
k − q¯k)
+
2(N − 1)√NCc(γk − qk)
(γ − q)N +
d(1 − q¯k)
1− q¯ ,
(21)
where i ∈ V , and C1 = maxn∈V |yn(0)|, n ∈ V .
Proof: For each positive integer k,
E(|yi(k)− x¯(k)|)
=E(|yi(k)− 1
T
Ny(k)
N
+
1TNy(k)
N
− 1
T
Nx(k)
N
|)
≤ 1
N
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E(|yi(k)− yj(k)|)
+
1
N
E(|1TNy(k)− 1TNx(k)|).
(22)
By (13), we get that
y(k + 1) = A(y(k) +w(k)) + x(k + 1)− x(k)
=A2y(k − 1) +A2w(k − 1) +Aw(k)
+A(x(k) − x(k − 1)) + x(k + 1)− x(k).
(23)
By repeating the above process, it can be obtained that
y(k + 1) =Ak+1y(0) +
k∑
j=0
Ak+1−jw(j)
+
k+1∑
j=1
Ak+1−j(x(j) − x(j − 1)).
(24)
Hence, by (24),
|yi(k + 1)− yj(k + 1)|
≤
N∑
n=1
|[Ak+1]in − [Ak+1]jn||yn(0)|
+
N∑
n=1
k∑
l=0
|[Ak+1−l]in − [Ak+1−l]jn||wn(l)|
+
N∑
n=1
k+1∑
l=1
|[Ak+1−l]in − [Ak+1−l]jn||xn(l)− xn(l − 1)|.
(25)
Note that
N∑
n=1
∣∣∣∣[Ak]in − 1N
∣∣∣∣
=
N∑
n=1
∣∣∣∣
[
Ak − 1N1
T
N
N
]
in
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣Ak − 1N1TNN
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
∞
≤
√
N
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣Ak − 1N1TNN
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ ≤ √Nγk,
(26)
where the last inequality is obtained by Lemma 1.
Hence,
|yi(k + 1)− yj(k + 1)|
≤2
√
NC1γ
k+1 + 2
√
NC
k+1∑
l=1
γk+1−lαl−1
+
N∑
n=1
k∑
l=0
|[Ak+1−l]in − [Ak+1−l]jn||wn(l)|,
(27)
where C1 = maxn∈V |yn(0)| as |yn(0)| for n ∈ V are
bounded.
Taking expectations on both sides of (27) gives
E(|yi(k + 1)− yj(k + 1)|)
≤2
√
NC1γ
k+1 + 2
√
NC
k+1∑
l=1
γk+1−lαl−1
+
N∑
n=1
k∑
l=0
|[Ak+1−l]in − [Ak+1−l]jn|E(|wn(l)|).
(28)
Recalling that E(|wn(l)|) = dq¯l, for n ∈ V ,
N∑
n=1
k∑
l=0
|[Ak+1−l]in − [Ak+1−l]jn|E(|wn(l)|)
=
2
√
Ndγ
γ − q¯ (γ
k+1 − q¯k+1).
(29)
Similarly,
2
√
NC
k+1∑
l=1
γk+1−lαl−1 =
2
√
NCc(γk+1 − qk+1)
γ − q . (30)
Hence,
E(|yi(k)− x¯(k)|)
≤2
√
N(N − 1)C1
N
γk +
2(N − 1)√Ndγ
(γ − q¯)N (γ
k − q¯k)
+
2(N − 1)√NCc(γk − qk)
(γ − q)N +
d(1 − q¯k)
1− q¯ ,
(31)
by further utilizing the results in Lemma 2.
C. Convergence analysis
In this section, we establish the convergence results for
the proposed method.
Theorem 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied.
Then,
lim
k→∞
E(||x(k) − x∗||2)
≤C22e−
mc
1−q +
c2NC2
1− q2 +Φ1 +Φ2,
(32)
where
Φ1 =4max
i∈V
{li}(N − 1)
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)
×
(
C1c
1− qγ +
Cc2q
(1− qγ)(1− q2)
)
,
(33)
and
Φ2 =2max
i∈V
{li}
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)
dcq×
(
2(N − 1)γ
(1− qγ)(1− q¯q) +
√
N
(1− q)(1 − q¯q)
)
,
(34)
where C2 = ||x(0)− x∗||.
Proof: By (13), we can get that
x(k+1)−x∗ = x(k)−x∗−αk[gi(xi(k), yi(k))]vec. (35)
Hence,
||x(k + 1)− x∗||2
=||x(k)− x∗ − αk[gi(xi(k), yi(k))]vec||2
=||x(k)− x∗||2 − 2αk(x(k) − x∗)T [gi(xi(k), yi(k))]vec
+ α2k||[gi(xi(k), yi(k))]vec||2.
(36)
Noticing that gi(xi(k), yi(k)) is uniformly bounded by C,
we can get that ||[gi(xi(k), yi(k))]vec||2 ≤ NC2. Hence
α2k||[gi(xi(k), yi(k))]vec||2 ≤ α2kNC2. (37)
Moreover,
− 2αk(x(k)− x∗)T [gi(xi(k), yi(k))]vec
=− 2αk(x(k)− x∗)T g(x(k))
+ 2αk(x(k)− x∗)T (g(x(k)) − [gi(xi(k), yi(k))]vec)
≤− 2αkm||x(k)− x∗||2
+ 2αk(x(k)− x∗)T (g(x(k)) − [gi(xi(k), yi(k))]vec).
(38)
Noticing that gi(x(k)) is globally Lipschitz with constant li,
we get that
||g(x(k))− [gi(xi(k), yi(k))]vec||
≤max
i∈V
{li}||y(k)− 1N x¯(k)||. (39)
Therefore,
− 2αk(x(k)− x∗)T [gi(xi(k), yi(k))]vec
≤− 2αkm||x(k)− x∗||2
+ 2αkmax
i∈V
{li}||x(k)− x∗||||y(k) − 1N x¯(k)||,
(40)
and
||x(k + 1)− x∗||2
≤||x(k)− x∗||2 − 2αkm||x(k)− x∗||2 + α2kNC2
+ 2αk max
i∈V
{li}||x(k)− x∗||||y(k)− 1N x¯(k)||.
(41)
Moreover, as x(k + 1) = x(k)− αk[gi(xi(k), yi(k))]vec,
||x(k + 1)− x∗|| ≤||x(k)− x∗||+ αk
√
NC
≤||x(0)− x∗||+ cC
√
N
1− q .
(42)
Let C2 = ||x(0)− x∗||, we have
||x(k + 1)− x∗||2
≤||x(k) − x∗||2 − 2αkm||x(k)− x∗||2 + α2kNC2
+ 2αkmax
i∈V
{li}
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)
||y(k)− 1N x¯(k)||.
(43)
Taking expectations on both sides of (43) gives
E(||x(k + 1)− x∗||2)
≤(1− 2αkm)E(||x(k) − x∗||2) + α2kNC2
+ 2αk max
i∈V
{li}
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)
×
E(||y(k) − 1N x¯(k)||).
(44)
By Theorem 1,
2αkmax
i∈V
{li}
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)
E(||y(k) − 1N x¯(k)||)
≤2αkmax
i∈V
{li}
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)
(2(N − 1)γkC1
+
2(N − 1)dγ
γ − q¯ (γ
k − q¯k) + 2(N − 1)Cc(γ
k − qk)
γ − q
+
√
Nd(1− q¯k)
1− q¯ ).
(45)
Therefore,
E(||x(k + 1)− x∗||2)
≤
k∏
j=0
(1− 2αjm)E(||x(0) − x∗||2) +
k∑
j=0
α2jNC
2
+
k∑
j=0
2αj max
i∈V
{li}
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)(
2(N − 1)γjC1
+
2(N − 1)dγ
γ − q¯ (γ
j − q¯j) + 2(N − 1)Cc(γ
j − qj)
γ − q
+
√
Nd(1 − q¯j)
1− q¯
)
.
(46)
Let k →∞, then
lim
k→∞
E(||x(k) − x∗||2)
≤
∞∏
j=0
(1− 2αjm)E(||x(0) − x∗||2) +
∞∑
j=0
α2jNC
2
+
∞∑
j=0
2αj max
i∈V
{li}
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)(
2(N − 1)γjC1
+
2(N − 1)dγ
γ − q¯ (γ
j − q¯j) + 2(N − 1)Cc(γ
j − qj)
γ − q
+
√
Nd(1 − q¯j)
1− q¯
)
,
(47)
in which
∞∑
j=0
2αj max
i∈V
{li}
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)(
2(N − 1)γjC1
)
=4(N − 1)C1max
i∈V
{li}
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)
c
1− qγ ,
(48)
and
∞∑
j=0
2αj max
i∈V
{li}(C2 + cC
√
N
1− q )
2(N − 1)dγ
γ − q¯ (γ
j − q¯j)
=4(N − 1)max
i∈V
{li}dγ
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)
cq
(1− qγ)(1− q¯q) .
(49)
In addition,
∞∑
j=0
2αj max
i∈V
{li}
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)
2(N − 1)Cc(γj − qj)
γ − q
= 4max
i∈V
{li}
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)(
(N − 1)Cc2q
(1− qγ)(1 − q2)
)
,
(50)
and
∞∑
j=0
2αj max
i∈V
{li}
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
) √
Nd(1− q¯j)
1− q¯
=2max
i∈V
{li}
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
) √
Ndcq
(1− q)(1 − qq¯) .
(51)
Rearranging these terms gives
lim
k→∞
E(||x(k) − x∗||2)
≤
∞∏
j=0
(1− αjm)E(||x(0) − x∗||2)
+
c2NC2
1− q2 +Φ1 +Φ2
≤C22e−
mc
1−q +
c2NC2
1− q2 +Φ1 +Φ2,
(52)
in which the last inequality is derived by utilizing 1−αjm ≤
e−αjm and E(||x(0)− x∗||2) ≤ C22 . Moreover,
Φ1 =4max
i∈V
{li}(N − 1)
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)
×
(
C1c
1− qγ +
Cc2q
(1− qγ)(1− q2)
)
,
(53)
and
Φ2 =2max
i∈V
{li}
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)
dcq×
(
2(N − 1)γ
(1− qγ)(1− q¯q) +
√
N
(1− q)(1 − q¯q)
)
.
(54)
Remark 7: From the above analysis, it is clear that
limk→∞ E(||x(k)−x∗||2) is bounded by C22e−
mc
1−q+ c
2NC2
1−q2 +
Φ1 + Φ2, where C
2
2e
− mc1−q is resulted from the initial error.
Moreover, c
2NC2
1−q2 and Φ1 depend on stepsize selection. In
addition, Φ2 is resulted from the added noises wi(k), i ∈ V .
D. Differential privacy
In this section, we show that the proposed method is ǫ-
differentially private. To analyze the privacy level for the
proposed Nash equilibrium seeking strategy, we consider two
adjacent function sets F (1) = {f (1)i }Ni=1, F (2) = {f (2)i }Ni=1
where f
(1)
i = f
(2)
i , ∀i 6= i0, and f (1)i 6= f (2)i for some
i0 ∈ V . Note that if ∇if (1)i = ∇if (2)i for i = i0, the
two sequences generated by the proposed method under F (1)
and F (2) would be the same by enforcing the added noises
to be the same, indicating that the proposed method is of
complete privacy. Hence, in the rest, we only consider the
case in which ∇if (1)i 6= ∇if (2)i for i = i0. In addition, the
worst case scenario is considered, i.e., the adversary knows
A,x(0), {fi}i6=i0 , αk and the distributions of the random
variables. Moreover, the observations are O = {Ok}∞k=0,
where Ok = {p(k)}.
Then, the following theorem can be derived.
Theorem 3: Suppose that Assumption 3 is satisfied. Then,
the proposed method in (11)-(12) is ǫ-differentially private,
where
ǫ =
2cCq¯
d(q¯ − q) . (55)
Proof: For any fixed initial state x(0), we see from
(11)-(12) that
xi(1) = xi(0)− α0gi(xi(0), yi(0)), (56)
and hence xi(1), and xi(1)− xi(0) are fixed. Moreover,
yi(1) =
N∑
j=1
aijpj(0) + xi(1)− xi(0), (57)
and hence if pj(0) for j ∈ V are fixed, we get that
wl(0) and yi(1) are fixed. Repeating the above analysis,
we get that for any set of objective functions, if we fix the
observation sequence, then, there exists a unique sequence
x(k),y(k),w(k) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · } that can generate the
sequence of observation. Hence, under the set of objective
functions F (l), l ∈ {1, 2}, there exists a bijective mapping
from the noise sequence to the set of observations. For
notational convenience, denote the mapping as Ω(l)(w), l ∈
{1, 2}, respectively.
Moreover, for presentation clarity, we denote the sequence
generated by the proposed method under F (1) as
x
(1)
i (k + 1) =x
(1)
i (k)− αkg(1)i (x(1)i (k), y(1)i (k)),
y
(1)
i (k + 1) =
N∑
j=1
aijp
(1)
j (k) + x
(1)
i (k + 1)− x(1)i (k).
(58)
Correspondingly, the sequence generated by the proposed
method under F (2) is given by
x
(2)
i (k + 1) = x
(2)
i (k)− αkg(2)i (x(2)i (k), y(2)i (k)),
y
(2)
i (k + 1) =
N∑
j=1
aijp
(2)
j (k) + x
(2)
i (k + 1)− x(2)i (k).
(59)
As x
(1)
i (0) = x
(2)
i (0), y
(1)
i (0) = y
(2)
i (0), it can be easily
obtained that for i 6= i0,
x
(1)
i (k) = x
(2)
i (k), y
(1)
i (k) = y
(k)
i (k), (60)
for all nonnegative integer k, given that the two function
sets generate the same observations. Therefore, to ensure that
y
(1)
i (k) + w
(1)
i (k) = y
(2)
i (k) + w
(2)
i (k), we only need to
enforce that,
w
(1)
i (k) = w
(2)
i (k), (61)
for i 6= i0.
Moreover, for i = i0, we enforce that
∆wi(k) = −∆yi(k), (62)
in which ∆wi(k) = w
(1)
i (k)−w(2)i (k),∆yi(k) = y(1)i (k)−
y
(2)
i (k) and
∆yi(k + 1) = ∆xi(k + 1)−∆xi(k)
= −αk∆gi(k),
(63)
where ∆gi(k) = g
(1)
i (x
(1)
i (k), y
(1)
i (k)) −
g
(2)
i (x
(2)
i (k), y
(2)
i (k)), and ∆xi(k) = x
(1)
i (k)− x(2)i (k).
Let w(l)(k) = [w
(l)
1 (k), w
(l)
2 (k), · · · , w(l)N (k)]T and
w(l) = {w(l)(k)}∞k=0 for l ∈ {1, 2}. Moreover, let O(l)
be the sequence of observations under the function set F (l).
According to (61)-(63), we know that for each w(1), there
exists a unique w(2) such that O(1) = O(2). Let B(·)
be a mapping such that w(2) = B(w(1)) if and only if
O(1) = O(2). Then, it is clear that B(·) is bijective. Let
Γ(l) = {w(l)|Ω(l)(w) ∈ O}, then, following the analysis in
[17], it can be obtained that
P{F (1)|O}
P{F (2)|O} =
∫
Γ(1)
∏N
i=1
∏∞
k=0 L(w(1)i (k), θk)dw(1)∫
Γ(2)
∏N
i=1
∏∞
k=0 L(B(w(1)i (k)), θk)dw(1)
,
(64)
in which ∏N
i=1
∏∞
k=0 L(w(1)i (k), θk)∏N
i=1
∏∞
k=0 L(B(w(1)i (k)), θk)
≤
N∏
i=1
∞∏
k=0
e
|p
(1)
i
(k)−y
(1)
i
(k)−(p
(2)
i
(k)−y
(2)
i
(k))|
θk
=
∞∏
k=0
e
|∆wi0
(k)|
θ(k) ≤ e
∑∞
k=0
|∆yi0
(k)|
θ(k) .
(65)
By the boundedness of the gradient value, we get that
|∆yi0(k)| ≤ 2Cαk.
Therefore,
e
∑∞
k=0
|∆yi0
(k)|
dq¯k ≤ e
∑∞
k=0
2Cαk
dq¯k . (66)
By further noticing that q¯ ∈ (q, 1), we get that
e
∑∞
k=0
|∆yi0
(k)|
dq¯k ≤ e 2Ccq¯d(q¯−q) . (67)
Note that i0 ∈ V stands for any player engaged in the game,
we can conclude that the privacy level of the whole system
is ǫ = 2Ccq¯
d(q¯−q) , i.e., the proposed method is ǫ-differentially
private.
Remark 8: In many existing works on distributed opti-
mization and Nash equilibrium seeking, the decaying step-
size is required to satisfy
∞∑
k=0
αk =∞,
∞∑
k=0
α2k <∞, (68)
to establish the convergence results (see, e.g., [7][34]). How-
ever, in this paper, we adopt a decaying stepsize that satisfies
∞∑
k=0
αk <∞. (69)
Note that this is required to establish the ǫ-differential
privacy of the proposed method, i.e., differential privacy is
not achievable with not summable stepsize in the proposed
method. Therefore, the convergence accuracy is sacrificed
to some extent for differential privacy. Note that this is in
accordance with the “impossibility result for 0-LAS message
perturbing algorithms” in [16] and some other existing results
on differential privacy (see, e.g., [14]). The tradeoffs between
the convergence property and differential privacy will be
discussed in more details later.
Remark 9: In reality, communication channels are often
subject to various kinds of noises during information dis-
semination (see e.g., [29]-[30] and the references therein).
Therefore, if we can do some experiments to investigate
the characteristics and properties of communication noises
in real communication channels, it would be an interesting
open question to study whether it is possible to employ the
noises in the communication channels to achieve differen-
tially private Nash equilibrium seeking or not.
E. Tradeoffs between the accuracy and privacy level
From (72), it can be seen that
lim
k→∞
E(||x(k) − x∗||2) ≤ D, (70)
where D = C22e
− mc1−q + c
2NC2
1−q2 +Φ1+Φ2 and Φ2 is resulted
from the added noises.
By Theorem 3, ǫ = 2cCq¯
d(q¯−q) . Therefore,
d =
2cCq¯
ǫ(q¯ − q) . (71)
To see the tradeoff between the convergence accuracy and
the privacy level, the accuracy bound D can be restated in
terms of ǫ as:
D =C22e
− mc1−q +
c2NC2
1− q2 +Φ1 + Φ˜2, (72)
where Φ1 is defined in (33) and,
Φ˜2 =2max
i∈V
{li}
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)
2Cc2qq¯
ǫ(q¯ − q)×(
2(N − 1)γ
(1− qγ)(1− q¯q) +
√
N
(1− q)(1 − q¯q)
)
.
(73)
From (72), it can be seen that with q, q¯, c being fixed,
D = O(1
ǫ
), indicating that the accuracy of the proposed
method becomes arbitrarily bad when the method is of
complete privacy. Hence, there is a tradeoff between the
convergence accuracy and the privacy level. However, the
presented result preserves the following properties:
1) For any given ǫ > 0, c, d, q¯, q can be tuned such that
the proposed method is ǫ-differentially private;
2) If privacy is not concerned, then, for any given
positive constant D, c, q¯, q can be tuned such that
limk→∞ E(||x − x∗||2) ≤ D.
The first property can be easily obtained by (55). The second
property is derived following the subsequent observations.
• For any bounded initial condition, C22e
− mc1−q can be
tuned to be arbitrarily small by adjusting c and q such
that c1−q is sufficiently large;
• Denote c1−q = ζ . Then, for fixed and sufficiently large
ζ,
c
1− qγ =
ζ(1− q)
1− qγ , (74)
and
c2
1− q2 =
ζ2(1 − q)
1 + q
. (75)
Noticing that the partial derivatives of
ζ(1−q)
1−qγ
and
ζ2(1−q)
1+q with respect to q are negative for q ∈ (0, 1)
and limq→1
ζ(1−q)
1−qγ = 0, limq→1
ζ2(1−q)
1+q = 0, it can be
concluded that c and q can be adjusted such that c1−qγ
and c
2
1−q2 are sufficiently small with fixed ζ. Therefore,
by such a tuning rule, C22e
− mc1−q + c
2NC2
1−q2 +Φ1 can be
adjusted to be arbitrarily small.
• Φ˜2 depends on the level of privacy ǫ and if privacy is
not of concern, ǫ can be chosen to be sufficiently large
such that Φ˜2 is sufficiently small.
From (72), we see that the accuracy of the proposed
method depends on c, ǫ, q¯ and q. Hence, we write D as
D(c, q, q¯, ǫ). With fixed requirement of privacy level (i.e.,
ǫ), one can tune c, q, q¯ by solving
min
c,q,q¯
D(c, q, q¯).
s.t. c > 0, q ∈ (0, 1), q¯ ∈ (q, 1).
(76)
Moreover, noticing that for any fixed c and q,
∂D
∂q¯
< 0, (77)
indicating that D is monotonically decreasing with any fixed
c, q. Hence, one can choose q¯ to be sufficiently close to 1 as
q¯ ∈ (q, 1) and solve
min
c,q
D(c, q)
s.t. c > 0, q ∈ (0, q¯),
(78)
to get the optimal c, q.
IV. EXTENSIONS TO TIME-VARYING COMMUNICATION
TOPOLOGIES
In the previous section, we suppose that the communi-
cation topology among the players is fixed, undirected and
connected for presentation clarity. Actually, the proposed
method can be slightly adapted to accommodate time-varying
communication graphs that satisfy the following conditions:
Assumption 5: There exists a positive integer z such that
(V ,⋃zl=1 El+k) is connected for all nonnegative integer k, in
which Gl = (V , El) is the undirected communication graph
at time l and El is the corresponding edge set at time l.
Note that in Section III, the communication graph is sup-
posed to be connected at each time instant k = {0, 1, 2, · · · }.
However, in this section, the communication condition is
generalized to be time-varying and it is only required that
there exists a positive integer z such that the joint graph⋃z
l=1 Gl+k is connected for nonnegative integer k.
Assumption 6: Let A(l) be the weight matrix associated
with Gl that satisfies:
1) There exits a positive constant δ such that aii(l) > δ,
aij(l) > δ if (j, i) ∈ El and aij(l) = 0, if (j, i) /∈ El;
2) A(l) is doubly stochastic, i.e., 1TNA(l) = 1TN ,
A(l)1N = 1N .
Let Ψ(k, s) = A(k)A(k − 1) · · ·A(s) where k ≥ s ≥ 0.
Then, under Assumptions 5-6, the following lemma can be
obtained.
Lemma 3: [35] Let Assumptions 5-6 be satisfied. Then,
1) limk→∞Ψ(k, s) =
1N1
T
N
N
, ∀s ≥ 0;
2) For k ≥ s ≥ 0, |[Ψ(k, s)]ij − 1N | ≤ θβk+1−s, where
θ = (1− δ4N2 )−2, β = (1− δ4N2 )
1
z .
With time-varying communication topologies, the Nash
equilibrium seeking strategy should be adapted as
x(k + 1) = x(k)− αk[gi(xi(k), yi(k))]vec
y(k + 1) = A(k)p(k) + x(k + 1)− x(k). (79)
Note that the variations of the communication graph will
only affect the convergence results but not the differential
privacy of the proposed method. Hence, in the following,
only the convergence results are presented.
First, following the proof of Theorem 1, the subsequent
result can be obtained.
Theorem 4: Suppose that Assumptions 5-6 are satisfied.
Then, for each positive integer k,
E(|yi(k)− x¯(k)|)
≤2(N − 1)θβkC1 + 2(N − 1)θdβ
β − q¯ (β
k − q¯k)
+
2θ(N − 1)Cc(βk − qk)
β − q +
d(1 − q¯k)
1− q¯ .
(80)
for i ∈ V .
Remark 10: From Theorem 4, it can be seen that com-
pared with the results under fixed communication topologies,
the time-varying communication topology would affect the
estimation speed.
Moreover, following Theorem 2, the subsequent conver-
gence result can be obtained.
Theorem 5: Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 and 5-6 are
satisfied. Then,
lim
k∞
E(||x(k) − x∗||2)
≤C22e−
mc
1−q +
c2NC2
1− q2 + Φ¯1 + Φ¯2,
(81)
where
Φ¯1 =4(N − 1)
√
Nθmax
i∈V
{li}
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)
(
C1c
1− qβ +
Cc2q
(1− βq)(1 − q2)
)
,
(82)
and
Φ¯2 =2max
i∈V
{li}
(
C2 +
cC
√
N
1− q
)√
Ndcq×
(
2(N − 1)θβ
(1− qβ)(1− q¯q) +
1
(1− q)(1 − q¯q)
)
.
(83)
V. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we consider the 5-player energy consump-
tion game studied in [8]. In the energy consumption game,
player i’s objective function is given by
fi(x) = (xi − xˆi)2 + (0.04
5∑
i=1
xi + 5)xi, (84)
in which xˆ1 = 50, xˆ2 = 55, xˆ3 = 60, xˆ4 = 65, xˆ5 = 70.
As demonstrated in [8], the game has a unique pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium at x∗ = (41.5, 46.4, 51.3, 56.2, 61.1). In
the following, fixed communication topologies and time-
varying communication topologies will be considered suc-
cessively.
1
2
3 4
5
Fig. 1: The communication graph for the players.
A. Nash equilibrium seeking under fixed communication
topologies
In the simulation, the players are supposed to commu-
nicate via a cycle depicted in Fig. 1. Correspondingly, the
weight matrix is given as
A =


0.5 0.2 0 0 0.3
0.2 0.5 0.3 0 0
0 0.3 0.5 0.2 0
0 0 0.2 0.5 0.3
0.3 0 0 0.3 0.4

 ,
and c = 1, q = 0.9, d = 1, q¯ = 0.99. Moreover, the
proposed method is run for 2000 times for the observation
of the simulation results. Fig. 2 shows the expectations of
the players’ squared Nash equilibrium seeking errors, i.e.,
E((xi(k) − x∗i )2) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5} from which we see
that the proposed method drives E((xi(k)−x∗i )2) to a small
neighborhood of zero. Fig. 3 (1) plots E((yi(k)− x¯∗)2) for
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5} generated by the proposed method and Fig.
3 (2) shows y¯i(k) − x¯∗ for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5}, where y¯i(k)
denotes the averaged value of yi(k) for the 2000 running
times and x¯∗ = 15
∑5
i=1 x
∗
i .
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Fig. 2: The expectations of the players’ squared Nash equilib-
rium seeking errors, i.e., E((xi(k)−x∗i )2), i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5},
generated by the proposed method in (11)-(12).
To show the tradeoff between the convergence accuracy
and d, we vary d from 0 to 3 and observe the simulation
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Fig. 3: (1): The expectations of the players’ squared estima-
tion errors on x¯∗, i.e., E((yi(k)−x¯∗)2) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5};
(2): The plots of y¯i(k)− x¯∗ for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5} generated
by the proposed method in (11)-(12).
results. Fig. 4 plots E(||x(∞) − x∗||2). Roughly speaking,
the figure shows that as d increases, the upper bound of
E(||x(∞) − x∗||2) increases, which illustrates the tradeoff
between the privacy level and the convergence accuracy.
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Fig. 4: The plot of E(||x(∞) − x∗||2) with d varying from
0 to 3.
To observe the data distributions generated by the pro-
posed method, we fix d = 1, q¯ = 0.99 and run the proposed
method for 20000 times. Fig. 5 plots the data distributions of
xi(∞) and its corresponding fitted density functions for i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , 5}. Fig. 6 shows the data distributions of yi(∞)
and the plots of the corresponding fitted density functions
for players 1-5, respectively. From Figs. 5-6, we see that
the players’ actions converge to a small neighborhood of the
Nash equilibrium with a high probability under the given
parameters.
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Fig. 5: The plots of data distributions of xi(∞) and the cor-
responding fitted density functions for players 1-5, generated
by the proposed method in (11)-(12).
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Fig. 6: The plots of data distributions of yi(∞) and the cor-
responding fitted density functions for players 1-5, generated
by the proposed method in (11)-(12).
B. Nash equilibrium seeking under time-varying communi-
cation topologies
In the simulation, we suppose that the communication
topology among the players switches between the two graphs
depicted in Fig. 7. Correspondingly, we define
A(k) =


0.3 0.3 0 0 0.4
0.3 0.5 0.2 0 0
0 0.2 0.5 0 0.3
0 0 0 1 0
0.4 0 0.3 0 0.3

 ,
for k ∈ {0, 2, 4, 6, · · · }. In addition,
A(k) =


1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0.7 0.3
0 0 0 0.3 0.7

 ,
for k ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7 · · · }. For comparison convenience, the
parameters are chosen as those in Section V-A. Moreover, the
proposed method is run for 2000 times for the observation
of the simulation results. Fig. 8 plots E((xi(k)− x∗i )2), i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , 5}, and the two sub-figures in Fig. 9 depict
E((yi(k) − x¯∗)2) and y¯i(k) − x¯∗ for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5},
respectively. From Figs. 8-9, it can be seen that driven by
the proposed method, E((xi(k) − x∗i )2), E((yi(k) − x¯∗)2)
and y¯i(k) − x¯∗ for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5} would converge to a
small neighborhood of zero. In addition, comparing Fig. 8.
(2) with Fig. 3. (2), it is clear that the players can achieve
the aggregate estimation at a faster speed under the fixed
communication topology given in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 7: (a) is the communication graph for the players at
k = {0, 2, 4, 6, · · · } and (b) is the communication graph for
the players at k = {1, 3, 5, 7, · · · }.
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Fig. 8: The expectations of the players’ squared Nash equilib-
rium seeking errors, i.e., E((xi(k)−x∗i )2), i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5},
generated by the proposed method in (79).
To show the tradeoff between the privacy level and the
convergence accuracy under the time-varying communication
topologies, we vary d from 0 to 3. Correspondingly, the plot
of E(||x(∞) − x∗||2) with different values of d is given in
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Fig. 9: (1): The expectations of the players’ squared estima-
tion errors on x¯∗, i.e., E((yi(k)−x¯∗)2) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5};
(2): The plots of y¯i(k)− x¯∗ for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5} generated
by the proposed method in (79)
Fig. 10, from which we see that E(||x(∞)−x∗||2) increases
with d.
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Fig. 10: The plot of E(||x(∞)−x∗||2) with d varying from
0 to 3.
Likewise, to observe the data distributions generated by
the proposed method, we fix d = 1, q¯ = 0.99 and run the
proposed method for 20000 times. The data distributions of
xi(∞) and yi(∞) for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 5}, together with their
corresponding fitted density functions are plotted in Figs. 11-
12. Figs. 11-12 show that the players’ actions converge to
a small neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium with a high
probability under the given parameters.
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Fig. 11: The plots of data distributions of xi(∞) and
the corresponding fitted density functions for players 1-5,
generated by the proposed method in (79).
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Fig. 12: The plots of data distributions of yi(∞) and the cor-
responding fitted density functions for players 1-5, generated
by the proposed method in (79).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper considers privacy-preservation in the dis-
tributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for networked
aggregative games. To estimate the averaged value of the
players’ actions, a dynamic average consensus protocol is
employed in which the transmitted information is masked
by independent random noises drawn from Laplace distri-
butions. The random noises are included for the protection
of the players’ objective functions. Moreover, with the es-
timated information, the gradient descent method with a
decaying stepsize is implemented to optimize the players’
objective functions. The convergence property as well as the
privacy level of the proposed method are analytically investi-
gated. It is shown that there is a tradeoff between the conver-
gence accuracy and the privacy level. Fixed communication
topologies and time-varying communication topologies are
addressed successively in the paper. Privacy-preserving Nash
equilibrium seeking for more general games (see e.g., the
games considered in [25]-[27]) will be included in our future
works.
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